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SOVEREIGNTY AND THE CONTROL OF 
WATER POLLUTION 
By David G. Lehv* 
The persistent and adamant refusal of Grafton, Massachusetts 
to heed state directives requiring the construction of a municipal 
sewage treatment facility has threatened the enforcement of all 
state environmental legislation. In examining the Grafton dilemma, 
this article explores the problems inherent in the administrative 
and judicial imposition of obligations on an unwilling community, 
and the nature of the sovereign's role in the protection of its re-
sources. 
Grafton, a town with a population of twelve thousand persons 
on the Blackstone River, pours its refuse untreated into that 
river. During the period 1943 to 1971 efforts by local officials to 
fund pollution abatement programs for the Town's use of this 
river were rejected by the townspeople.! Similarly, the towns-
people failed to respond to a 1967 deadline set by the State Di-
vision of Water Pollution Control for approval of a sewage plan. 
Continued noncompliance with that order caused the Division 
to bring suit against the town in March 1970 for polluting the 
Blackstone River in violation of the Massachusetts Clean Waters 
Act of 1966. A final decree was entered by the Massachusetts 
Superior Court in Equity the following October, stipulating that 
a town meeting should be held in order to allocate funds for the 
construction of a sewage system. Approval of the funding, however, 
was denied at three consecutive town meetings. 
Within eighteen days of the last rejeCtion, a petition from the 
State Attorney General's office was filed to show cause why the town 
should not be held in contempt. The Massachusetts Superior 
Court then found Grafton in contempt on two counts of willful 
failure to comply with the final decree. It imposed a fine of two 
thousand dollars on the town and required compliance with the 
421 
422 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS 
original order. In addition, the court deemed it "appropriate to 
call to the attention of the special town meeting ... what the law 
of this Commonwealth is if the town meeting should continue to 
defy the Commonwealth and this court."2 The opinion quoted at 
length from the 1943 case of Commonwealth v. Hudson,3 which 
detailed the subordinate role of municipalities in relation to the 
state's legislative and judicial functions and advanced potential 
sanctions against the disobedient municipal corporation. 
The town, however, failed to allocate funds for a sewage plan at 
two subsequent meetingS". Selectmen cited the cost of the project 
($10 million, of which the town's share would be $5.8 million, 
necessitating a $24.00 per thousand tax hike), the intended loca-
tion in a residential neighborhood, and the proposed exclusion 
from the system of several existing homes as the substantive 
reasons for the project's continued defeat.4 
As a result of this violation of the contempt order, a petition 
was filed in June, 1971 demanding that the town be held in con-
tempt for a second time. The Superior Court again found Grafton 
in contempt, but was reluctant to "use its powers of contempt to 
compel voters to vote in a particular manner,"5 or to impose an 
additional fine. The court expressed doubt that the legislature ever 
envisaged "a situation such as happened here, where a Town is 
adamant, or, a portion of the voters of the Town are adamant and 
refuse to obey a Mandate of the Legislature."6 
The Court's concern about its role has left unresolved the is-
sue of enforcing environmental legislation upon a recalcitrant 
municipality. If Grafton is successful, the result may well render 
the state incapable of protecting the health of its citizens through 
environmental control legislation. The potentiality of Grafton-
like municipal responses in any state makes imperative an aware-
ness of the difficulties that may be encountered when a municipality 
opposes legislatively sanctioned orders. It necessitates a review of 
the established interest of the sovereign in the condition of its 
waters, the state's authority to compel a recalcitrant municipality 
to make ecological improvements despite the recorded opposition 
of the inhabitants, and finally, the procedure by which the state 
may exact funds sufficient to effect its purposes. 
POLICE POWER 
The authority of a state legislature to deal with pollution rests 
in the police power. The police power is inherent to every sov-
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ereign state.7 It is intrinsically regulative, employed to prevent 
activities by individuals harmful to the state, and to promote the 
general safety.8 "It includes anything which is reasonable and 
necessary to secure the peace, safety, health, morals, and best in-
terests of the public."9 As long as the power is not exercised in an 
arbitrary or capricious manner, or so as to contravene the Con-
stitution of the United States, it is considered a proper and essen-
tial function of the legislature.lo 
The protection of health is indisputably within the scope of the 
police power. In no field is the authority of the state greater. l1 The 
effects of water pollution on the populace is included in the defi-
nition of what may be protected in the interests of public health. 
In State Board of Health v. City of Greenville,12 an act of the 
Ohio General Assembly authorizing the State Board of Health to 
"require the purification of sewage, public water supplies and 
protect streams against pollution"13 was found to be a "valid and 
constitutional exercise of the police power of the state."14 The 
court elaborated: 
Cities are no longer enclosed by stone walls and separate and apart 
from the balance of the state. The sanitary condition existing in any 
one city of the state is of vast importance to all the people of the state, 
for, if one city is permitted to maintain unsanitary conditions that 
will breed contagious and infectious diseases, its business and social 
relation with other parts of the state will necessarily expose other 
citizens to the same diseases.15 
Clearly pollution of water may affect health. Since water pollu-
tion is not restricted to a single municipality/6 the powers of the 
state in such matters should be supreme. "That the preservation of 
the water of the state from pollution, involving danger to health, 
is a proper subject for the exercise of police power cannot be 
seriously questioned."17 Therefore the issue becomes whether 
there has been a legitimate delegation of powers to a state division 
of water pollution. This determination is necessary if the orders 
of that agency are to have the force capable of overcoming the 
recorded opposition of a municipality. 
The general rule is that the legislature, in order to accomplish 
a specific result, has the right to delegate authority to an existing 
board or commission or to create an agency and to endow it with 
the necessary power.18 The Wisconsin Supreme Court was con-
fronted with this issue in State ex rei. Martin Attorney General v. 
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City of Juneau,19 where the facts were quite similar to those which 
surround Grafton. The Wisconsin State Board of Health and the 
State Committee on Water Pollution found that the discharge of 
inadequately treated sewage from the City of Juneau into a drain-
age ditch had caused contamination of the ditch. The directives by 
the Board and Commission to the City to correct the situation were 
rejected by the City as being beyond the delegated authority of 
the agencies. The Court held that the directives were a legitimate 
function of the state agencies and as such the City was compelled 
to comply. 
In Grafton the legitimacy of the orders of the Division of Water 
Pollution Control is substantiated by the Division's enacting legis-
lation. Specifically, the State Division of Water Pollution Control 
was established with one of its basic purposes being to "encourage 
the adoption and execution by cities and towns ... of plans for the 
prevention, control, and abatement of water pollution."20 The 
division is empowered to "require by order a city, town, person or 
any other entity maintaining a sewerage system or water pollution 
abatement facility to provide and operate such facility in such a 
manner as is in its opinion necessary to insure adequate treat-
ment prior to discharge into the waters of the Commonwealth."21 
This enactment evidences the legislature's commitment to exer-
cise the police power, through the State Division of Water Pollu-
tion Control, in order to provide for the public health and safety 
as it is affected by water pollution. 
EXTENT OF STATE AUTHORITY 
The state, by virtue of the police power, has a vested interest 
in the condition of its waters. The critical issue is the degree to 
which its authority may be imposed upon municipalities. The 
citizens of Grafton may argue that as they are the citizens most 
directly affected, they should determine the method of Grafton's 
waste disposal. 
However, due to Grafton's inaction, Massachusetts has assumed 
a controlling role in the town's pollution abatement activities. 
This position results from the following three policy considera-
tions: first, that the state as guardian of the public good is un-
fettered by political subdivisions; second, that the inhabitants of 
Grafton are first of all citizens of the state; and third, that the 
town itself may not exercise its powers in contest with the state.22 
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The court in Greenville, having reviewed the statutes establish-
ing a state board of health, held that provisions for the preserva-
tion of the life and health of the people of the state were no more 
suspended within a municipality than are the criminal laws of the 
state. It asserted that it would be "folly" for a state to delegate 
complete control of public health matters to any municipality.2a 
The Greenville court continued that, "A municipality might in the 
preservation of sanitary conditions in its own territory work in-
calculable mischief to the health and comfort of people living in 
adjacent territory. To prevent this being done, it is primarily 
necessary that there should be one central authority clothed with 
the power of affording equal protection to all. "24 
This issue of state authority over a municipality was first in-
tensively examined in Delaware in 1884. The facts and opinion of 
Coyle v. Gray25 are markedly pertinent to the circumstances of 
Grafton. The Delaware General Assembly, in a statute establish-
ing a board of water commissioners for the City of Wilmington, 
appointed three residents to its governing board. The new com-
mission attempted to remove one Coyle, who had been the chief 
engineer of the Wilmington waterworks. In refusing to surrender 
his position, however, Coyle charged that the act of the legislature 
was void as an unconstitutional deprivation of property without 
due process of law. A municipal corporation, he argued, is of a dual 
character, and although in performing public functions it is con-
cededly subject to the absolute control of the legislature, there is 
another sphere in which it acts solely as an agent of the inhabi-
tants. As such it enjoys privileges that inure to a private corpora-
tion, such as having its property, here the city waterworks, 
protected by those constitutional guarantees afforded to all per-
sons, i.e., against any regulation or control by the state. 
The court, however, distinguished between private corporations 
and "corporations intended to assist in the conduct of local self-
government."26 The former are created for private purposes; cor-
porations chartered for the governing of a town or city, however, 
are created for public advantage. "It [a public corporation] has no 
vested powers or franchises. Its charter or act of right to incorpora-
tion is in no sense a contract with the state. It is subject to the 
control of the legislature, who may enlarge or diminish its terri-
torial extent or its functions, and may change or modify its internal 
arrangement, or destroy its very existence, at discretion."27 
In Massachusetts, the General Court has specified that in order 
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for the Commonwealth to exercise control over a municipality the 
action must satisfy two criteria: first, the act must be designed for 
the good and welfare of the Commonwealth; second, it must be 
administered by a public agency, and for public uses exclusively.28 
These standards were met by the Division of Water Pollution 
Control's order to the Town of Grafton. First, the Massachusetts 
Clean water Act of 1966 has as its purpose protecting citizens' 
welfare by forbidding the pollution of state waters and second, 
the act is administered by a public agency (the Division of Water 
Pollution Control) and for a public use (here, sewage treatment). 
Consequently, Grafton retains only minimal control over measures 
taken by the state in the interest of the health of its citizens-:-
It has been settled that the legislature may authorize and require 
a town to appropriate money for any public use within its bound-
aries.29 What the Grafton case puts in question is the implemen-
tation of legislative or judicial will over the express, contrary results 
of a town meeting:'lO 
The Grafton court, recognizing the mechanics of raising the 
funds in issue, ordered on two occasions that a town meeting be 
convened and that the townspeople vote the appropriations for a 
sewage plant. Not until the third hearing did the court express 
doubts as to its part in directing residents' votes. 
Although the court was apparently reluctant to employ the full 
extent of its power, previous Massachusetts decisions imply that it 
was not always so apprehensive. In Commonwealth v. Hudson, the 
Town of Hudson was ordered by the Department of Public Health 
to chlorinate its water supply and thereby prevent pollution from 
wartime sabotage. The counsel for the defendant town contended: 
that the power to appropriate money of a defendant town is vested 
exclusively in voters at a town meeting; that they have a right to act 
according to their untrammelled judgment, and may refuse to ap-
propriate money even to discharge adjudicated duties or obligations 
of the town; that the Commonwealth and its courts are powerless un-
less the voters of the town in the town meeting give their approval 
and concurrence; that when unquestioned obedience is imposed upon 
the people, even upon the people of a subordinate governmental unit 
like a town, and even obedience to an order of the legislative branch 
of the State government adjudged valid by the judicial branch, 
then "democracy is dead"; and consequently, since a decree would be 
futile and unenforceable, that this court should order none.31 
The court, however, disagreed: 
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That argument is so full of dangerous errors, and if relied on by 
the town and its officers and inhabitants might lead to such serious 
consequences to them, that we are unwilling by silence to permit 
counsel or his clients to 'remain under the delusion that a town may 
thus safely defy the Commonwealth and its courts.32 
It went on to explain that although town meetings are a recognized 
form of carrying out municipal affairs in the Commonwealth, the 
"powers of a town and of its town meeting, and the very existence 
of the town, are subject to the will of the Legislature."33 Moreover, 
the court recognized that powers exercised by the voters may be 
taken away and vested in officers appointed by the Governor34 or 
in a state board.35 
The Court, citing the United States Supreme Court in Wilson 
v. United States,36 declared that the town voters, having a duty 
to make appropriations, stood no differently from officers of a 
corporation under edict from the government. In Wilson, a private 
corporate officer in possession of a corporate record containing 
incriminating evidence against him was compelled to produce 
the record for judicial inspection. A command to the corporation 
was deemed tantamount to a command to those responsible for the 
conduct of corporate affairs. If such individuals neglected to take 
action, they, no less than the corporation, would be liable to 
punishment for contempt. 
If the residents of Grafton may be likened to the officers of a 
corporation, it follows that the citizens' rights may be curtailed 
when exercised in conflict with legitimate state interests. When 
acting as the controlling body of a municipality, town voters pos-
sess no greater immunity from state orders than do the decision-
makers of a private corporation.37 The language of Kroese v. Gen-
eral Steel Castings Corporation38 is perhaps the most applicable 
to the dilemma faced by the Massachusetts court regarding a 
municipal vote on a court order. In Kroese, a suit was brought 
by a preferred stockholder of a private corporation to compel a 
declaration of dividends by the board of directors. The court ex-
cused its interference with the management of private business by 
saymg: 
... when a court steps in and orders the payment of a dividend, the 
corporate affairs have reached the point where the judgment of the 
directors is no longer controlling ... the court substitutes its judg-
ment, based on a rule of law, for the ordinary business judgment of 
those in charge of the business enterprise. The court says, in effect, 
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to the directors, "You have abused your office. You have withheld 
earnings of this enterprise from those who, by the rules of law gov-
erning it, are entitled to be paid those earnings. You go ahead and 
pay them.39 
Analogizing the Town of Grafton to a private corporation, the 
above language might become directly applicable to the situation 
in Grafton: 
... when a court steps in and orders an appropriation of money, the 
town's affairs have reached the point where the judgment of the town 
meeting is no longer controlling ... the court substitutes its judg-
ment, based on a rule of law, for the ordinary fiscal judgment of the 
citizens in town meeting assembled. The court says, in effect to the 
citizens. "You have abused your powers. You have failed to appropri-
ate money despite valid administrative and judicial orders to do so, 
for the benefit of the public at large. You have no choice but to make 
the necessary appropriation."40 
The interests of the state override those of a town when they 
concern powers reasonably exercised in the protection of the 
health, safety and general welfare of the populace. To hold differ-
ently would contravene the grant of authority in the Massachusetts 
Clean Waters Act of 1966 and negate the findings of contempt and 
the orders issued by the Superior Court. If, in fact, the lawmakers 
did not "envision a situation such as has happened here, where a 
Town is adamant or a portion of the voters of the Town are 
adamant and refuse to obey a mandate of the Legislature," there is 
yet no reason to believe that they intended to allow a single un-
cooperative community to render the mandate nugatory. 
EXISTING JUDICIAL AND LEGISLATIVE REMEDIES 
The state, having established that its interest in water pollution 
abatement is superior to that of a municipal corporation, is still 
faced with the dilemma of practicable enforcement. The Town's 
rejection of sewage proposals in the face of Division and court 
orders necessitates an examination of the alternatives available to 
the state. 
Civil Contempt 
Civil contempt results from a failure to comply with a court 
order. It is a remedial holding designed to protect and further the 
interests of the complaining party.41 The Grafton court might 
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continue to hold the town in civil contempt and thus impose on 
it a fine for each day of noncompliance. Such a procedure was em-
ployed in Department of Health of New Jersey v. Borough of Ft. 
Lee42 in 1931 when, despite a final court decree enjoining the 
Borough from befouling certain waters, the Borough continued its 
pollution. The Borough's noncompliance was strenuously de-
nounced by the court. "No attention, regard, or obedience has been 
paid by this borough to the directions of the Legislature, the acts 
of the administrative department of health, nor the process and 
decrees of this court. ... No more flagrant or reprehensible course 
of conduct by a municipal corporation, or by the individuals re-
sponsible for the administration of its affairs can well be imag-
ined."43 Although the usual method for compelling compliance 
with a court decree is imprisonment of the contemnor until per-
formance, such a recourse is impossible with respect to a munici-
pality. The New Jersey court instead imposed a per diem fine on 
the Borough in order to coerce it into submission.44 
The imposition of a similar fine by the Massachusetts Superior 
Court upon the town of Grafton has proved fruitless. Grafton has 
been subject to a final decree, two citations for contempt, and a 
fine of two thousand dollars, yet it has continued to defy the state. It 
has shown that the remedy of civil contempt has no effect upon a 
determined municipality. 
In order to overcome this sort of impasse, several New England 
states subscribe to the doctrine of Commonwealth v. Hudson: "For 
the satisfaction of a judgment or decree for payment of money by 
a town, the property of any inhabitant may be taken."45 Such a 
drastic remedy, however, has not been adopted in any other region 
of the United States. In those New England states where it sur-
vives, the action is usually made unnecessary by the existence of 
a high level of municipal credit.46 
Criminal Contempt 
Grafton's continued refusal to comply with the Court's orders 
might also be treated as criminal contempt. Acts that obstruct the 
administration of justice by offending the dignity of the court or 
tending to bring the court into disrepute, may be deemed crim-
ina1.47 Unlike its civil counterpart; the primary purpose of crim-
inal contempt is the vindication of public authority. It can be used 
to punish the contemnor for disobedience of court orders. 
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The court in Commonwealth v. Hudson considered the threat 
of criminal contempt an effective way to induce compliance: 
Of course the fear of such punishment, like the fear of punishment 
for a crime in general may have a coercive effect. It may induce com-
pliance with the decree. Where the duty to perform the decree con-
tinues, and performance remains possible, it is hard to see why 
repeated penalties may not be imposed for failure to obey during 
successive periods of time.48 
But the same obstacles arise here that occur in a civil contempt 
proceeding involving a municipality. The impossibility of im-
prisoning a municipality necessarily leaves a fine as the only puni-
tive measure available to the courts. There is no reason to suppose 
that the Town of Grafton would be any more inclined to pay a 
fine that represented a criminal penalty than a fine that constituted 
a remedial solution. It is true that town officers may be held 
liable for the town's failure to respond to a court order, but the 
selectmen of Grafton apparently acted in good faith throughout 
the entire affair; moreover, in light of the history of the case, it is 
doubtful that such a recourse would bring about any substantial 
change. 
Mandamus 
The court might issue a writ of mandamus directing the town 
to finance the construction of the sewage plant. Mandamus is "a 
writ directed to a person, officer, corporation, or inferior court 
commanding the performance of a particular duty that results from 
the official status of the one to whom it is directed or from opera-
tion of law."49 It is an extraordinary remedy to be used in civil 
cases where usual forms of procedure are powerless to afford relief.50 
Civic improvements, however, are not generally controllable 
by a writ of mandamus. A court cannot require a municipal cor-
poration to construct a sewer irrespective of the discretion vested 
by law in the local authorities.51 Mandamus will only lie to compel 
the performance of a nondiscretionary duty. Again, the court is 
faced with the peculiar circumstances of Grafton's noncompliance. 
Whether the appropriation by town meeting of funds for a re-
quired sewage facility is such a nondiscretionary act as to be sus-
ceptible to mandamus is highly speculative. A city or town has 
dominion over public places within its bounds, and it is said to be 
the "province of the corporation and not a judicial tribunal to 
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determine what improvements shall be made in the streets and 
canals of the city."52 
Criminal Prosecution 
In Massachusetts, the pollution of the waters of the Common-
wealth is an offense punishable by a fine of not more than one 
thousand dollars. Each day that such discharge continues consti-
tutes a separate offense and is likewise punishable by fine. 53 
In assessing the utility of this expedient to prevail upon the 
Town of Grafton, it need only be recognized that the device by 
which the state's aim is implemented is a fine. Hence, the likeli-
hood of its success is no greater than any other sanction imposing 
the identical penalty. 
Extreme Emergency 
The Commonwealth may in an emergency circumvent the 
usual town meeting requirements for authorization of appropria-
tions. Massachusetts law provides that for "cases of extreme emer-
gency involving the health or safety of persons or property"54 two-
thirds of the town selectmen may authorize the incurring of lia-
bility on behalf of a town. The townspeople's right to vote on the 
specific issue is taken away and entrusted to the town officers. 
This theory's application was discussed in Commonwealth v. 
Hudson, which involved chlorination of a town water supply. The 
court there said: 
We are not at all convinced that a refusal of the voters to appropriate 
money for compliance with the legislative order and the decree of the 
court in this case would not create such an emergency and give the 
commissioners of public works and the selectmen a right and a dut)' 
to act. 55 
It is probably noteworthy that Commonwealth v. Hudson was a 
1943 case, and the chlorination order was predicated on a desire to 
protect the water from wartime sabotage. It does not seem that 
the less extreme circumstances surrounding Grafton constitute an 
"extreme emergency." For example, in Constitutional Construc-
tion Company v. Lawrence,56 the court rejected a unanimously 
passed declaration of the city council of Lawrence, Massachusetts, 
that an unusually large amount of snow constituted an extreme 
emergency as to the people's health and safety. Specifically, the 
court said that "the failure of a town ... to appropriate a reason-
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able sum for board of health work does not constitute an 'emer-
gency' within the meaning of this section."57 
Although what constitutes an extreme emergency is largely un-
determined, it is difficult to envision the Grafton episode as quali-
fying as an extreme emergency. The emergency provision seems to 
provide for only an impending catastrophe or a very pressing need. 
Appointment of a Board of Finance 
There have been at least three occasions in Massachusetts when 
the financial affairs of a city have been taken away from its voters 
and officers and entrusted to a state board. An explanation of this 
resort was made in Broadhurst v. Fall River,58 where an act creat-
ing such a board of finance was upheld. 
The several towns and cities are instrumentalities of government 
largely under the control of the General Court. Their powers and 
duties may be changed and may be vested in officers appointed by the 
Governor instead of those selected by the people or by other munici-
pal authorities, provided the Legislature deems in its wisdom that the 
public welfare requires it. Financial affairs constitute fundamental 
and underlying aspects of the administration of municipalities. There 
is no sound reason to doubt the power of the General Court to segre-
gate that part of the government of a city from its other affairs and 
place its management exclusively in a board created an appointed 
as that established [for Fall River].59 
In Massachusetts the towns of Millville, Mashpee, and Fall 
River have all been the subjects of acts appointing boards of finance. 
Only the last of these bills was ruled upon by a court. But the 
cause of action in Broadhurst v. Fall River, accrued after the effec-
tive date of the bill creating the board, and the court's ruling was 
therefore not made, as the situation in Grafton would demand, in 
response to any analogous delinquency on the part of the town. 
Precedent thus does not appear to support the use of a board of 
finance to solve the singular problem presented by the town of 
Grafton. 
SUGGESTED JUDICIAL AND LEGISLATIVE REMEDIES 
Town as Judgment Debtor 
In certain instances a creditor of a municipality may reduce his 
claim to a judgment, secure execution thereon and levy on the 
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corporation's property. The Town of Grafton might be viewed as a 
judgment-debtor owing restitution to the state for the pollution of 
the waters of the Commonwealth.60 It would then be susceptible 
to all the devices available for the collection of claims against a 
municipality that neglects or refuses to honor its obligations.61 
In Grafton, the town's obligation to raise and expend money 
for a public improvement has already been reduced to judgment. 
That the damages have been borne diffusely by the state's citizens 
rather than an individual creditor should make no difference III 
holding the town responsible for the results of its pollution.62 
Mandamus 
If Grafton is to be treated as a judgment-debtor, then mandamus 
will lie to compel a municipal corporation to exercise the taxing 
power for its payment.63 In United States v. New Orleans,64 the 
petitioner sought a writ of mandamus for the payment of judg-
ments out of town proceeds or, in the alternative, the collection of 
a special tax. The expenditure had been for the construction of' a 
public project and the court ruled that when the authority to 
borrow money or incur an obligation for a public purpose has been 
granted, the power to levy a tax for its payment accompanies it. 
Having the power to levy a tax for the payment of ... judgments ... 
it was the duty of the city, through its authorities, to exercise the 
power. The payment was not a matter resting in its pleasure, but a 
duty which it owed to the creditor. Having neglected this duty, the 
case was one in which a mandamus should have been issued to en-
force its performance.65 
The writ of mandamus is not unknown in Massachusetts66 where 
statute67 provides for the payment of final judgments against a mu-
nicipality and for the employment of its property tax as a means of 
financing them. 
Defenses are available, however, that will defeat an application 
for a writ of mandamus. The actual lack of funds where no tax 
has been imposed has always been a good defense to the writ,68 and 
mandamus will not lie where no funds are available and funds 
for other purposes could not be diverted to pay the judgment.69 
A writ to compel the levy of sufficient taxes for the desired ap-
propriation is also possible. But even if collected, the exhaustion 
of available funds or their diversion into improper uses will render 
the writ futile and constitute a successful defense.7o It is further-
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more rare that such a tax ever nets the full revenues for which it 
is designed. Statutory tax limitations and unavoidable delinquep-
cies combine to keep the tax far below the theoretical maximum. 
Decreased property values or reduced incomes resulting from 
periods of economic depression may do the same.71 
Where the amount in question is so large as to endanger the 
town's internal functioning, it could be spread over a number of 
years. Grafton would not be required to provide the full amount 
immediately; only that amount necessary for that year would be 
due at a time. With the cooperation of local officials the diversion 
of those revenues might be forestalled. 72 
Unlikely as this possibility is in light of the defenses that may be 
raised, it deserves attention. It suggests, as does the language of 
Commonwealth v. Borough of Confluence that it is the claim of 
lack of funds which should give way where the public interest is so 
conclusively at stake: 
If we were to hold that financial inability is a defense to an action 
in mandamus [for the construction of a sewage system], it would 
put our Court in the anomalous position of rendering "futile and 
effectual" a clearly defined public policy as enumerated by the leg-
islature ... Furthermore, such a result would render the courts of 
Pennsylvania powerless to implement this legislative determination 
and in effect would sanction the harmful discharge of sewage into the 
waters of the Commonwealth.73 
Sequestration 
Sequestration is used to enforce equitable decrees and punish 
contemnors. It is the authorized taking of the real or personal 
property of a defendant. The property may be held until compli-
ance with the court order, or dealt with otherwise as the court 
directs. 74 Monies subject to sequestration might be any funds that 
the town may have on hand or whatever state funds might be 
slated for Grafton. 
Such an action, however, is without precedent in Massachu-
setts.75 It violates a well-accepted theory that there supposedly 
exists with :respect to sequestration a "fixed principal of absolute 
immunity extended by the law in order to protect the essential 
functions of municipal corporations from the disruptions which 
might be incident to this remedial process."76 
It is similar reasoning that governed the Illinois Supreme Court 
in City of Chicago v. Hasley. 
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They [m unici pal corporations] cannnot be said to possess property 
liable to execution, in the sense an individual owns property so subject, 
for they have the control of the corporate property only for corporate 
purposes, and to be used and disposed of to promote such purposes, 
and such only. Levying on and selling such property, and removing 
it, would work the most serious injury in any city.77 
The position is a logical one, as the possibility exists that withhold-
ing monies might indeed work irreparable injury to municipal 
functions. 
In rebuttal, it may be contended that "[the] logical extension of 
this same argument ... would lead to the absurd conclusion that 
payment of accrued claims against a municipality should never be 
enforced when all revenues received by the municipality could be 
used to furnish public services more necessary and beneficial than 
those which gave rise to the accrued claim."78 Clearly, there are 
few more essential, beneficial, or purely governmental exerCIses 
than the maintenance of an adequate sewage facility. 
Ultimately, however, sequestration is susceptible to many of 
the same factors that would work to defeat mandamus. The total 
real and personal property available may not equal the price of the 
expenditure. In addition it seems lUllikely that the voters would 
voluntarily make any necessary further appropriations. 
Such are the variables that tend to weaken the analogy of the 
municipality as a judgment-debtor. Available defenses to manda-
mus and sequestration actions are implicit in the. theories of 
municipal government. Consequently, the methods and possibilities 
of obtaining sufficient fU,nds are both undesirable and remote. 
Legislation 
The existing alternatives for enforcement of a state order are 
restricted by difficulties of execution. Examination of these alterna-
tives leads to the conclusion that the state is without a genuinely 
acceptable course of action in compelling Grafton to accede to its 
demands. Therefore, it is submitted that the state should refrain 
from attempting to force the defiant municipal corporation into 
compliance. Instead, the state should playa contributory role in 
the resolution of this problem. The basis for this suggestion is that 
the state has an interest in its waters, and should share in the 
burden of correcting abuses. The legislature might establish an 
autonomous sewer authority of limited duration for the purpose of 
constructing a sewage disposal facility.79 
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The sewer authority could be in the nature of a self-liquidating 
improvement and thus relieve the municipality and the state from 
the necessity of producing the requisite funds or credit. The burden 
of cost would fall evenly upon the users of the system on the basis 
of payment for services rendered. For example, collection from 
persons paying rents would be a more successful method of fund-
ing given the various collection procedures available against in-
dividual debtors. Moreover, the act would indicate legislative 
recognition that the state must actively share with municipalities 
the task of protecting water resources. 
Precedent for this exists in the New York court decision in 
Robertson v. Zimmermann80 in 1935. There the State of New York, 
discerning the financial inability of the City of Buffalo to construct 
a sewage facility, created the Buffalo Sewer Authority. The Au-
thority was vested with complete control over the construction of 
a new plant. Funds were to be obtained through bond issues pay-
able exclusively from its own funds and "sewer rents" to be col-
lected on all real property served by its facilities. Neither the 
city's credit nor that of the state could be pledged, and there was 
to be no diversion of existing city funds. After five years the 
Authority would pass to the City of Buffalo. 
In upholding the legality of the Authority, the court stated: 
since the city itself cannot meet the requirements of the situation, the 
only alternative is for the state, in the exercise of its police power, to 
provide a method of constructing the improvements and of financing 
their cost. 81 
Special or Local Law 
The establishment of a distinctly "Buffalo" sewer authority in 
the Robertson case raised issues relevant to any similar Massachu-
setts legislation. The act was attacked as being a "special" or "local" 
law of the type prohibited by New York statute. Since the very 
terms of the act stated its limitation to a single city, it was difficult 
to argue that it governed the activities of any other municipality, 
and was hence "special" or "local" on its face. 
The Robertson court, however, saw the act as an attempt to 
remedy a general condition affecting the citizens of the State. It 
looked beyond the "terms" of the act to its "effect," and found 
that the effect was more than local. The act had not been designed 
for the sole protection of the inhabitants of Buffalo, but also for 
the other communities using the same water source. The Robert-
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son court applied the test that if the subject of such a statute was "in 
a substantial degree a matter of State concern, the Legislature 
might act though intermingled with it are concerns of the local-
ity."82 
Special or local legislation in Massachusetts is prohibited by a 
constitutional provision, the Home Rule amendment, which states 
that "the general court shall have the power to act in relation to 
cities and towns, but only by general laws which apply alike to all 
cities, or to all towns, or to all cities and towns, or to a class of not 
fewer than two .... "83 The critical question arises of whether the 
Massachusetts courts will be as willing as the New York court was 
to look at the "effect" of such a bill. 
A 1969 Opinion of the Justices of the Supreme Judicial Court 
of Massachusetts concerned a proposed statute for the creation of 
a stadium authority to oversee the financing and construction of 
a large multi-purpose stadium, vehicular tunnel and toll road in 
the City of Boston.84 The Justices found that the "Stadium Bill" 
was designed for the general benefit of several communities and 
that construction of the stadium would contribute to the "prosper-
ity, health, culture and welfare"85 of the state's citizens. 
We do not interpret the words "to act in relation to cities and towns" 
as precluding the Legislature from acting on matters of State, re-
gional, or general concern, even though such action may have special 
effect upon one or more individual cities or towns. If the predomi-
nant purposes of a bill are to achieve State, regional, or general 
objectives, we think that, as heretofore, the Legislature possesses legis-
lative power, unaffected by the restrictions in art. 89 §8 [Home 
Rule).B6 
A second Opinion of the Justices87 concerned the passage of legisla-
tion providing for the acquisition by West Springfield of land in 
the town of Southwick for the purpose of gaining an additional 
water supply. Although the bill would have affected only the 
activities of a single town, the court found that water resources 
were a matter of State concern. Consequently, the court charac-
terized the bill as a "general law." 
The approach taken in these Massachusetts opinions resembles 
that of the New York Court of Appeals in Robertson v. Zimmer-
mann. Therefore, it would seem reasonable to assume that the 
Massachusetts courts would look favorably upon the creation of a 
Grafton sewer authority. 
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General Law 
An alternative to legislation applicable to a single community 
might be the enactment of a general law applicable to any com-
munity which failed to comply with a state administrative agency's 
order to abate pollution. The Home Rule Amendment in Massa-
chusetts validates "general laws which apply alike to all cities or 
to all towns, or to all cities and towns ... " 
Hence the passage of a bill providing for the creation of sewer 
authorities as a continuing means of enforcement would appear 
judicially acceptable. It would "apply alike" to every city or town 
of the state capable of water pollution activities. It would con-
stitute a power to which any municipality violating water pollution 
standards would be subject. 
Massachusetts law provides precedent for this type of legislation. 
The statute that created the Division of Water Pollution, and 
granted to it the authority to issue orders such as the one in 
Grafton, is an example of such general legislation. The Division 
exists for the purpose of overseeing the condition of state waters 
and, at times, acts to regulate the activities of a single municipality. 
Ideally, the statute authorizing the creation of a sewer authority 
would be an amendment to the "powers and duties of division 
[of water pollution controlJ."88 Specifically it might provide that: 
For any city or town of the state) under an order of the Massachu-
setts Division of Water Pollution Control to construct an adequate 
sewage treatment facility) which does not do so within [a specified 
amount of time] the division may establish a sewer authority with 
the following powers . .. Couched in sufficiently broad terms the 
proposed general law would withstand assertions that it constituted 
de facto special legislation, and would provide a valuable weapon 
in the state's arsenal for the enforcement of administrative orders. 
CONCLUSION 
Once the nexus between waste disposal and the health, safety, 
or general welfare of the populace has been established, the pre-
dominance of state authority under the police power is established. 
Orders issued under this authority may be judicially enforced 
against an uncooperative municipality despite a majority vote of 
the town meeting. 
However, the traditional methods of securing compliance with 
court decrees do not easliy lend themselves to the situation wherein 
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a single town adamantly refuses to heed a state directive. The 
peculiar nature of the offender makes it immune from imprison-
ment and therefore able to ignore the imposition of any number 
of fines where incarceration constitutes the sole recourse for non-
payment. Actions such as the declaration of an extreme emergency 
or the appointment of boards of finance lack the precedent to make 
them truly effective tools of legislative coercion. Similarly there 
is little to indicate that a court would treat a municipality as an 
ordinary judgment-debtor. 
It is submitted that only by assuming a more activist stance 
than has been exhibited in the Grafton controversy can a state 
exercise thorough and effective prevention of water pollution. 
Passage of a general law providing for the creation of autonomous 
sewer authorities whenever municipalities do not comply with 
state orders requiring the abatement of water pollution would 
provide the kind of solution that satisfies the purpose of the order 
without intensifying possible state-local antipathies. Pollution 
control is best seen as a statewide concern beyond the competing 
interests of political subdivisions. 
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